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Universal Goal-Seekers* 
E MARK GOLD 
Poste Restante, World 
A formal model is constructed of the general goal-seeking situation in 
which a thinker interacts with an environment. The thinker produces outputs 
and the environment produces input to the thinker and rewards. The thinker 
"adapts" to an environment if it learns to produce outputs which receive high 
rewards. The thinker and environment are taken to be discrete, synchronous, 
deterministic black boxes with a finite starting time. For various classes of 
environments, the question is asked, "Is there a universal thinker of a certain 
type, a thinker which will adapt o any environment of the class ?" It is found, 
for instance, that if the class of finite state environments is considered, then 
there is no universal thinker which is finite state, but there is a universal thinker 
which is primitive recursive. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this report is the general goal-seeking situation depicted in 
Fig. 1. At each time t, the thinker receives two inputs which were generated 
by its environment, information it and the reward-punishment signal rt ,  and 
the thinker operates on its environment by choosing an output or. Time is 
taken to be quantized and have a finite starting point: 
t = 1,2,.... 
At each time a single symbol passes along each communication channel, 
drawn from the finite alphabet which is assigned a priori to that channel: 
oteO i~eI r~R. 
R is assumed to be a set of real numbers. The object of the thinker is to 
choose outputs which will induce its environment to generate high values of 
* The results described herein were obtained under the support of Lear-Stagier, 
Inc., Santa Monica, California. 
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FIG. 1. 
Environment I 
I Thinker 
The general goal-seeking situation. 
rt, More specifically, thinkers are compared in a given time interval by 
comparing the sum of the r, obtained by each during the interval. 
Both the thinker and its environment are taken to be deterministic black 
boxes. That is, each is to consist solely of a function which determines its 
output as a function of its previous inputs. Precise definitions are given in 
the next section. 
Problems of the following type are the subject of this report. The following 
are specified: 1) A class of possible environments (e.g., all finite automata). 
2) An allowed type of thinker (e.g., finite state). 3) The minimum reward 
values which the thinker must obtain for it to be said that the thinker adapts 
to its environment. The following question is asked: Is there a universal 
thinker, a thinker of the allowed type which will adapt to any of the possible 
environments ? 
Suppose that the possible nvironments are taken to be the class of recursive 
(i.e., computable) environments. It is obvious that, due to the memory 
limitation of the thinker, one cannot hope to find a finite state thinker which 
will eventually receive the highest possible reward values for any such 
environment. However, one might hope to construct a finite state thinker 
which will learn any rules governing its environment which are simple enough 
to be well within the memory capacity of the thinker. For instance, it might 
seem reasonable to seek a thinker T realizable by a finite automaton with 10 6 
states which can adapt o the following degree: Given any recursive nviron- 
ment, or at least any finite state environment, T will eventually obtain r~ 
values at least as high, on the average, as the best finite state thinker for that 
environment with, say, 10 a states. However, the following results how that, no 
matter how weakly "adaptation" is defined, a universal thinker is not possible 
if the possible environments are allowed to be as complex as the thinker. 
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Theorem 2.1 says that, for any finite state thinker, there is a finite state 
environment with at most one state more than the thinker, such that the 
following holds: I f  the thinker is connected to this environment, at every 
time the thinker will do the only possible wrong thing. Therefore, there is a 
thinker with constant output, i.e., a thinker with no states, which will do 
better than this thinker. Theorem 2.2 says, similarly, that for any thinker 
which is primitive recursive, or recursive, there is an environment which is 
primitive recursive, or recursive, such that the thinker will always do the 
worst possible thing. 
The point of Section 3 is that a universal thinker is possible if the thinker 
is allowed to be more complex than any of the possible environments. 
Theorem 3 says that there is a primitive recursive thinker T which will 
adapt to any finite state environment E in the following, very strong sense: 
The average reward received by T will approach the maximum possible 
average reward for E. 
One might hope to get around the negative results of Theorems 2.1 and 
2.2 by means of a game theoretic approach: Instead of a single thinker, one 
might seek a thinker strategy which can be guaranteed to adapt to any 
possible environment. A thinker strategy signifies a set of thinkers with a 
probability distribution. The latter represents the probability that any 
particular thinker of the set will be used. In this way, one might hope to 
guarantee, say, a 90 % probability of adapting to any environment of some 
general class. However, the last theorem of Section 2 is a strong, negative 
result in this direction: 
Theorem 2.3 says that, given any finite set of finite state thinkers, there is a 
finite state environment with the following property: If  the environment is 
connected to any of the thinkers, the thinker will, after a finite time, invariably 
do the worst possible thing. 
All the theorems cited above, due to their general nature, are independent 
of the existence of information signals i t . 
2. No SIMPLE, UNIVERSAL GOAL-SEEKERS 
Alphabet. An alphabet will signify a finite, nonvoid set of real numbers. 
I f  A is an alphabet, then _d* will signify the set of finite strings of elements 
of A, including the null string. 
Thinker and Environment. In order to specify a goal-seeking situation, 
depicted in Fig. 1, one must specify the three alphabets, O, I and R, and a 
thinker and environment. An environment consists of a function E¢ from 
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O* to I and a function Er from O* to R. A thinker is a function T from 
( I×R)* to  O. 
El : O* "-+ I, Er : O* ~ R 
T : ( I  × R)* -+ O. 
a goal-seeking situation, its operation is determined Behavior. Given 
as follows: 
it = Ei(ol ,..., or_l), 
r t = E f (o  1 , . . . ,  Or - l ) ,  
0 t = T( i l ,  rl .... , i t - l ,  rt-1). 
The resulting output sequence 01 , o 2 ,... of the thinker will be called the 
behavior of T. 
The environment will be called recursive, or primitive recursive, if Ei and 
E r are recursive, or primitive recursive. It will be called finite state if E~ and E~ 
can be realized by finite automata. Thinkers will be classified in the same way. 
Strongly Worst Behavior. In a goal-seeking situation, let the set of 
reward values be binary: 
R - -{0,  1} 
and let O contain at least two elements. A behavior will be called strongly 
worst if (1) for this behavior , ~ 0 for all t, but (2) for any behavior which 
differs from this one at any time, r, = 1 at all subsequent times, no matter 
what the behavior's ucceeding values may be. 
THEOREM 2.1. Let T be a finite state thinker such that R = {0, 1} and 0 
has at least two elements. Then there is a finite state environment E for which 
the behavior of T will be strongly worst. E can be realized with only one state 
more than T. 
Proof. A Moore-model environment E with the desired property will 
be demonstrated: Take the value of it produced by E to be a constant i 
independent of the bahavior of T. When i t = i and rt ~ 0 for all t, let T 
pass through states l ,  s2 ,... and produce outputs c~ 1 , co 2 ,.... Since T has a 
finite number of states, let s~+l be the first repeated state of the sequence 
s~+ 1 = s,~, where m ~< n. Then oJ, must have the same period c%+ 1 = co~. 
Take the environment to have n + 1 states So, S 1 .... , S~. Let S O produce 
r = 1 and all the other states produce r ~ 0. Let S 1 be the initial state of 
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the environment.  All that remains is to specify the next-state transformation 
of the environment:  
So -~ S 0 for all or, 
S~ ---* $3+ 1 if o, = %,  
- -+S o if o t ¢c%,  
where j = 1,..., n and S~+1 is taken to signify Sin. 
THEOREM 2.2. Let T be a recursive, or primitive recursive, thinker such 
that R = {0, 1} and 0 has at least two elements. Then there is a recursive, or 
primitive recursive, environment for which the behavior of T is strongly worst. 
The proof is trivial. 
THEOREM 2.3. Let T~ ,..., Tn be finite state thinkers, each having no more 
than a states. Then there is' an envb'onment with no more than (a + 1) '~ states 
such that after time t = a 2 -- a + 1 any of the T's will have a behavior which 
is strongly worst. 
Proof. Consider n environments of the type of Theorem 2.1, one for 
each Ts,  running in parallel. Let their combined output be i t = constant, 
and r t = 1 if each universe is in its trap state SO, r t = 0 otherwise. Thus,  
each of the behaviors of the Tj. will receive r = 0 for all t, and any other 
behavior will receive re = l starting from the time it has produced a sufficient 
number  of o~ to distinguish it from the behaviors of T 1 ,..., T~. In order to 
show that, after time t = (r 2 - -  a @ 1, the behavior of any Ts is strongly 
worst, it is necessary to show that if a behavior is the same as that of T~ up to 
time a ~ - -  cr ~- 1, and it differs later, then it can not be the behavior of one 
of the other T~. 
Suppose T~ and T~ have behaviors cot and co/. It  is to be shown that if the 
behaviors are different, then they must differ by a time of at most a 2 - -  a @ 1. 
Since co t and co/ are the outputs of finite automata with constant input 
and at most cr states, cot and co/ must be ultimately periodic with the time 
at the end of the first period being at most a. Therefore, the sequence of 
pairs, (cot, c°t') is ult imately periodic with the t ime at the end of the first 
period being at most a 2 - -  a -b 1. 
3. A COMPLEX UNIVERSAL GOAL-SEEKER 
The theorem of this section shows that there is a primitive recursive 
thinker which will adapt, in the following sense, to any finite state 
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environment: The average reward r~ received by the thinker will approach, 
in the limit, the maximum possible average r~ for the environment after 
some time t o . It is possible that the maximum average r~ is less after t o then 
it was initially, due to nonoptimal behavior of the thinker before t o . This 
possibility can't be avoided. For example, the environment may be such 
that the thinker's first output can trap it in a set of states which doesn't 
allow high values of r~. 
LEMMA 3. Let  a f in i te  state environment E be specified. There is a pr imi t ive  
recursive procedure fo r  f ind ing an u l t imate ly  periodic behavior 01 , 02 , . .  which 
is max imal  in the fo l lowing sense: Let  r 1 , r 2 ,... be the sequence o f  rewards 
produced by E when presented wi th  o 1 , o 2 , . . . .  Le t  r / ,  r2',.., be the sequence o f  
rewards received by any other behavior. Then 
exists, and  
lim (r I @ "'  + rO/t = 0 
lim sup (r 1' + "" + r~')/t <~ O. 
t->cO 
Proof.  Let e designate the number of states in the environment and n 
designate the number of elements in O. Consider all possible initial behaviors 
of length ~ + 1. There are a finite number n °+1 of them. From each one 
construct an ultimately periodic behavior as follows: If one of them is 
o l ,..., o~+1, it will cause the universe to pass through states s 1 ,..., s~+ 1 . 
There must be at least one repetition in this sequence of states. Let the first 
state which is repeated be s m and let its first repetition be sn+ 1. The behavior 
of interest is 
01 ~...~ O,m_ 1 , 0 m ~...~ O n , Om , . . , ,  O n , Om , . . . .  
This behavior will yield a string of rewards 
rl , . . . ,  rm- 1 , rra ,..., rn , rm ,..., rn , rra , . . . .  
For each of these behaviors, let 0 be the average value of r m ,..., r n . Choose 
one of the behaviors with the maximum value of 0. It will be shown that this 
behavior has the desired property. 
Let o1' , oK',.., be any behavior, and let rl' , r2',.., designate the rewards it 
receives. This behavior causes the environment to pass through states 
sl', s~', .... Let s~, be the first state which is repeated, and let s'~,+l be its 
¢ t first repetition. Note that n' <~ a. Thus, r~, ,..., r~, must have an average 
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t t • value which is no more than 0. Also, if o,,, .... , o n, is deleted from the behavior, 
then the new behavior 
r 0 ~ , _ 0 t 
02  , ' "~  m - - I  , n '+ l  ~ On'+2 ~"" 
! t will cause the universe to pass through the original states with s~,,  .... s~, 
t deleted and will receive the original rewards with r~, ,..., r n, deleted. Thus, 
this process can be continued indefinitely, always deleting sequences of the 
r(  whose average is ~0. 
THEOREM 3. For any triple of alphabets O, I, R there is a primitive 
recursive thinker T with the following property: Let E be any finite state 
environment with the same alphabets. Let the goal-seeking situation (T, E) 
produce the reward sequence r 1 , r 2 ,. . . .  Then 
lim (r 1 + .." + rt)/t = 0 
t -~O 
exists, and there is a time t o such that any behavior which is the same as that of T 
up to time t o will receive a sequence of rewards rl' , r(,. . ,  from E such that 
lim sup (r 1' + "" -]- rt')/t ~ O. 
t ~  
Proof. I have shown elsewhere (Gold 1965a, Theorem 10) that the class 
of finite state automata with a given input alphabet and output alphabet is 
"weakly identifiable in the limit". This means that there is a learning 
algorithm which will do the following: It will observe the outputs of any 
black box with the given input alphabet and output alphabet. As a function 
of these outputs, it will generate successive inputs to feed into the black box 
and simultaneously generate a sequence of guesses as to the identity of the 
black box. If  the black box is realizable by a finite state automaton, after some 
finite time the guesses as to its identity will all be correct. 
This theorem is proved by constructing the following primitive recursive 
learning algorithm. All finite state automata with the given input and output 
alphabets are enumerated in any way: FAa,  FA2 ,... .  In the first step of the 
learning process, the learning algorithm feeds a string of input symbols 
into the unknown black box such that FA 1 and FA2 will produce different 
output strings if presented with this input string. Therefore, at the end of 
this step, the output string of the black box being tested must differ from at 
least one of the possibilities, FA 1 and FA 2 . That is, in the first step at least 
one of the first two finite automata of the enumeration is eliminated as a 
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possible identity of the one being tested. In each following step of the 
learning process, the learning algorithm generates an input string which will 
produce different outputs from the first two finite automata of the enumeration 
which have not yet been eliminated. At each time, the learning algorithm 
guesses the identity of the black box being tested to be the first finite 
automaton of the enumeration which has not been eliminated. 
The thinker required by the above theorem can be constructed by the 
following modification of the above learning algorithm. At the end of each 
step of the learning process, the thinker uses its current guess as to the 
identity of the environment to design an optimal behavior of the type 
described in the above lemma. Let t be the maximum time required by the 
next learning step to distinguish between the first two uneliminated finite 
automata of the enumeration, maximized over all possible initial states at the 
beginning of the learning step. Then the thinker is to generate the currently 
guessed optimal behavior for a period of time t 2. 
After some finite time the learning process will correctly identify the 
environment, so that the succeeding periods of optimal behavior will indeed 
be optimal. Since the fraction of time spent at optimal behavior approaches 
1, the average reward must approach optimal. 
It remains to show that, after some finite time, the identity of the environ- 
ment does not change. The identity of a finite automaton changes when it 
enters a group of states from which it can not return to a previous tate. But, 
since a finite automaton has a finite number of states, the set of accessible 
states can be reduced only a finite number of times. 
4. A SPECIAL GOAL-SEEKING MODEL: R~WaRD SETS 
The subject of this section is a special goal-seeking model which is 
motivated by the following type of situation: Suppose that our thinking 
machine is to generate scientific articles which will be accepted by some 
specific journal. We will not give the machine any information except o tell 
it whether or not each of its outputs is acceptable. The question is, "Is there 
an algorithm the machine can use which will guarantee that it will eventually 
learn to produce only acceptable outputs without repetitions ?" 
Let A signify any finite, nonvoid set; A is fixed throughout this section. 
In this section, an output string will mean an element of A*. A set will mean 
a set of output strings, 
A reward set goal-seehing situation consists of a reward set G (goal) and 
a thinker T: G is an infinite set. At each time t, an output string o, is generated 
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by T as its output. The only input to T is a reward signal r, which is 1 if 
or c G and o r has not been generated previously by T; otherwise r, = 0. 
Formally, G is an infinite subset of A* and T is a function which takes a 
string of reward signals into an output string: 
o, = T(rl ,..., rt_l) 
.4daptability. It will be said that T adapts to G if there is a finite t o such 
that r, = 1 for all t ~> t o . Let C be a class of reward sets. I f  there is a 
recursive universal thinker for C, a recursive T which adapts to any G ~ C, 
then C will be called an adaptable class of reward sets. 
THEOREM 4. The class of infinite, regular sets is an adaptable class of 
reward sets. The class of infinite, primitive recursive sets is not. 
The proof may be found elsewhere (Gold 1965b, Chapter 5). It is long and 
involved, and its interest does not appear to be general enough to warrant 
inclusion here. 
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